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THE PRESIDENTIAL BUSINESS CYCLE IN THE U.S.:
A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION

RANJIT S. DIGHE
HONORS SEMINAR
2/23/87

l
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The idea of a poli~ically-motivated business cycle is basically
a conspiracy theory:

"office-motivated"1 politicians, seeking to

exploit the well-documented 2 relationship between favorable
economic news and votes for the incumbent president and his party,
manipulate the timing of business cycles for their own electoral gain.
This manipulation,

theorists maintain,

is effected through the use of

any of several policy instruments including discretionary federal
spending, government transfer payments, and the average tax rate,

as

well as pressure on the central bank to pursue a more accommodating
monetary policy.
Theories of such a cycle seem to fall in and out of favor with
each passing presidential election.
paper,

William Nordhaus's pioneering

"The Political Business Cycle" (1975), emerged in the aftermath

of Richard Nixon's 1972 re-election campaign, which even a former
Nixon speechwriter described as a case of "open[ing] the sluices and
let[tingJ the dollars flow. "3
Control of the Economy,

Edward Tufte, author of Political

an in-depth analysis of the interdependence

of economics and elections, has. acknowledged that Nixon's re-electi.on
was the inspiration for his book as well. 4
supply shocks of the mid- and late-1970s,

Currently, after the
which in 1980 resulted in a

(presidential) election-year recessionS for the first time since
1960,

"there has been relatively little theoretical work on the political

business cycle' for several years."6
Reagan in 1984,

With the re-election of Ronald

however, after which some observers claimed they detected

a political cycle behind the economic growth patterns of the 1981-84
period 7 ,

the next few years may well see a resurgence of political
1

business cycle (PBC) l iterature.
In keeping with the present lull in new PBC theories,
economists,

many

in reviews of PBC literature and elsewhere, have been

sharply critical of the previous empirical work in this area.
and K.

Alec Crystal,

James Alt

in their 1983 book Political Economics. conclude

a chapter on PBC' s by noting,

"No one could read the political business

cycle literature without being struck by the lack of supporting
evidence."B
(197B),

Severa l other studies,

including those of McCallum

Hibbs (1977 and 1978), Golden - Poterba (1980) and Beck (1982

and 1984), reJect the notion of a PBC. 9

Joseph Sulock recently

conducted replications of several PBC models, all of whose original
authors found evidence of a PBC, and reported that most of these models,
when updated into the 1970s or even when truncated into a timeframe when
political manipUlation appeared most likely, performed poorly.
admits,

however,

Sulock

that the poor performance of these models may have been

due to flaws in the models themselves rather than in the idea behind
them.
Although much of the criticism of past empirical work on the PBC
is well deserved -- indeed, some of these models are shockingly inept
a review of both the theoretical and empirical literature on this
subJect will be necessary before moving on.

l

Review of the Literature
The tradittonal Keynesian conception of government as a benevolent
institution that pursues a stabilizing countercyclical policy has long
come under fire,

perhaps most notably by conservatives such as Milton

Friedman and James Buchanan; but the first well-known dissent that
mentioned the possibility of a "political business cycle" was an

2

overtly Marxist article by Michael Kalecki in 1943.

In his article

Kalecki describes a cycle, which he said would be inevitable in a
capitalist democracy, such that in a slump,

the government undertakes

new public investment Iinanced by borrowing so as to prevent massive
unemployment.

"But iI attempts are made to apply this method in order

to maintain the high level OI employment reached in the subsequent boom,
a strong opposition OI 'business leaders'" -- who do not want a Iull employment regime because workers with secure Jobs would become too
demanding and disruptive,

rather than being the docile labor Iorce they

would preIer -- "is likely to be encountered."

Since big business and

the rentier interests have the government in their collective back
pocket,

Kalecki asserts,

their resistance to a Iull-employment policy

would Iorce the government to cut the budget deIicit,
another slump,
Clearly,

thereby causing

which would touch OII yet another cycle. 10
Kalecki's theory OI a PBC bears little resemblance to the

"oIIice-motivated" PBC described on page one,

but a paper that appeared

four years later by Johann Akerman did indeed suggest that presidential
elections were a causal Iactor in the timing OI economic cycles.

The

heart OI Akerman's paper is an empirical test using as its economic
indicator a quarterly index OI industrial stock values covering the

l
[

timeframe !830-1945 in the U.S.

As with Kalecki,

diIfers sharply from present-day PBC theory,

Akerman's conclusion

as he Iinds:

The election year spells hesitancy and a shortening of perspectives
affecting investment and employment; when the political question is
settled through the outcome OI the election, enterprise will grow
cumulativelv until the next election is Ioreshadowed, causing less
optimistic ~nticipations, and hence crisis and depression.!!
In Akerman' s view,

then,

PBC's have nothing to do with government policy

and everything to do with investor conIidence.
conclusion is a valid one,

Whether or not his

it should not be too surprising that his
3

findings are so directly in contradiction with

mod~rn

the latter generally covers the post-World War II,

PBC theory,

since

post-Keynes era.

Although Kalecki and Akerman studied political-economic cycles from
perspectives vastly different from those of recent PBC theorists,

their

work is relevant in that it established political business cycles as a
subJect of political-economic interest, thus laying the groundwork for
Nordhaus,

Tufte, et al.

As mentioned earlier, Nordhaus's 1975 article is commonly cited as
the watershed paper for present-day PBC theory.
Anthony Downs (1957),

Taking his cue from

who theorized that Adam Smith's self-interest

axiom applies equally well to politics as it does to economics 12 ,
Nordhaus begins by making the assumption that political parties are
solely interested in election outcomes, and that "[tlhe government
therefore chooses economic policies during its incumbency which maximize
its plurality in the next election. "13

In addition . he assumes that:

1)

voters hase their electoral decision on the rates of unemployment and
inflation at election time,

preferring both to be as low as possible;

2) governments are aware of this fact; and 3) governments are able to
manipulate movements along (and,
run Phillips eSP) curves.

to a lesser extent, shifts in) short-

Moreover,

an implicit assumption behind his

model is that the "government" as a whole is dominated by the wishes of
the incumbent president's party.
Having made these assumptions,

Nordhaus graphically constructs a

long - run "aggregate voting function," on which he then superimposes
modified short- and long-run Phillips curve constraints.
The exact slopes of the voting function and Phillips curves are
arbitrary.

Nordhaus's voting function is essentially a series of iso -

4
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or "iso-vote lines," as he calls ' them -- all of which are

concave from th e origin because the "goods" represented by the K- and y aKes are undesirable rather than desirable.

That is to say,

the

government maKimizes its utility by being on as low an iso-vote line as
possible:

hence the government manipulates shifts in and movements

along the SP curves in
line -- or

r~ther,

s~ch

a

m~nner

that the lowest possible iso - vote

the highest possible vote share -- is attained.

The SP curve at a given point in time,

The

which the incumbent cannot shift

substantially, provides a constraint similar to that of a budget line in
a normal iso-cost curve model.

As in micro theory,

the incumbent,

whom

Nordhaus assumes to be a vote - maximizer and also to be aware of the
relative inflation-unemployment preferences of voters,

will always

choose the point on the SP curve tangent to the iso-vote line.
Furthermore, by Joining all the possible outcomes,

we get the election

outcome line 00 (which corresponds to .the long-run production path for
a firm),

pictured in the second of the above figures.

5

Since macro theory tells us that a system of Phillips curves is
only stable when the economy is at "a point on the long-run Phillips CLP)
curve,

then the only stable equilibrium in the second of the above

figures is at point E3 ,
LP curve.

where the election outcome line intersects the

The optimal equilibrium would be E* <inked in),

where the

iso-vote line is tangent to the LP curve and the vote share roughly
51.57.,

but the government never reaches this point because it is not on

the election outcome line.

CNordhaus does not adequately explain why

the government would choose to follow the election outcome line in the
first place rather than move to E* and stay there 14 ; this is one of the
maJor shortcomings of his paper.)

Since inflation is considerably

higher at F3 than at E * and unemployment slightly lower at E3 than
at E*,

Nornhaus draws the conclusion that "the democratic outcome has

lower unemployment and higher inflation than the optimum. "15
After outlining this long-run theory of a political economy,

all of

which he assumes to take p l ace during a homogenous electoral regime,
Nordhaus turns to the possibility of politically - motivated cycles in the
short run.

As in th e long - run model,

concerned with two economic variables,

he assumes that voters are solely
inflation and unemployment; but

here he makes the additional assumption that they consider the values of
these two variables over the entire electoral period, rather than merely
at election time.

He further postUlates a vote function in which voters

"have a decaying 'memory' of past events.

On election day,

memory of

recent events is probably more poignant than that of ancient ills. "16
other words,

voters are both backward-looking and "myopic."

Nordhaus

describes a PBC as follows:
immediately after the election the victor will raise
unemployment to some relatively high level in order to combat
inflation.
As elections approach, the unemployment rate will be
6

In

lowered until, on election eve, the unemploy~ent rate will be
lowered to the purely myopic point. 17
He illustrates this cycle with the following figure,

one which appears

frequently in PBC literature:
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Since his long-run theoretical prediction,

"that the politically

determined policy choice will have lower unemployment and higher
inflation than is optimal," would be too difficult to test,

Nordhaus

opts instead to conduct a crude test of whether the short-run cycle
descrihed above actually exists.

For this empirical test,

he uses data

for unemp l oyment rates and elections in nine democratic countries -Australia, Canada,

U,K. and the U.S.
hypothesis,

France, Germany,

Japan,

New Zealand, Sweden,

over the postwar time span 1947-1972.

which he states rather vaguely,

electora l period of length 0,

the

His test' s

is that "during an

the unemployment rate should rise in

the first 0/2 years and fall in the second 0/2 years, "18 as well as the
assumptions that the probability of the unemployment rate rising or
falling in any period is one-half and that successive occurences are
statistically independent of one another.
Calculating a binomial probability of the observed unemployment
trends happening due to chance, he finds a strong coincidence of
7

unemployment and political cycles for three countries -- Germany,
Zealand and the U.S.

For the U.S.,

New

he reports nine observations that

conform with his hypothesis and only one that does not.

The cumulative

binomial probability of this pattern pccuringby chance is 0.011 (out
of 1).
Of all the nine countries studied, the U.S results appear to be the
most convincing evidence of a PBC, and as such they are widely cited by
other PBC theorists; but closer examination reveals them to be somewhat
spur:i.ous.

Nordhaus himself admits in a footnote that "the assumption of

..

independence is probably not warranted," so long as any external
business cycle exists at all. 19

Also, Nordhaus's assumption that the

probability of a rise or fall in unemployment is exactly one - half
creates another problem:

What if the overall trend in unemployment in a

a period was neither up nor down?
After attempting to replicate this test exactly,
periods (1959-60,

I found three

1961-62 and 1967-68) in which unemployment stayed

basically the same.

Rather than include these as observations not

conforming with the theory,

however, Nordhaus slyly discards them.

Had

he put forth a strict null hypothesis of the form
Ho:

l
l

unemployment doe s not rise in the first 0/2 years;
unemployment does not fall in the second 0/2 years,

he would not have had that luxury.

Moreover,

the cumulative binomial

probability of the resulting new pattern (9 conforming observations, 4
non-conforming observations) occuring by chance is 0.133
enough to encourage further research,

still low

but not low enough to be even

semi-conclusive.
Updating the observations through 1984 and using the most current
revisions of unemployment data available,
8

I obtained the following

results:
Before elections
Unemployment rate not falling
Unemployment rate falling*
After elections
Unemployment rate rising*
Unemployment rate not rising
Total
Conforms with theory*
Does not conform with theory
PROBABILITY OF THESE TOTALS
OCCURING BY CHANCE

4
6
6
3

12
7

0.180

* - indicates the movement that conforms with the theory
The above table is adapted from Nordhaus.
Since Nordhaus does not specify exactly what he means by "rising"
or "falling" over a two-year period, I used my own specifications in
replicating his test.
I used quarterly data, comparing the final
qu~rters of successive two-year periods and taking any change in the
unemployment "rate of less than 0.21 to be sci miniscule as to count
as neither a rise nor fall.
Thus,

after including all observations from 1947-72 and updating

through 1984,

the results become somewhat less promising.

This is

hardly surprising, given the supply shocks of the 1970s; but I strongly
doubt that Nordhaus meant for his test to be conclusive.

For one thing,

his test is supposed to show coincidence (of political and economic
cycles),

not causality.

techniques,

Moreover,

because of imprecise measurement

the unemployment rate is often an unreliable indicator of

economic activity.

In short,

Nordhaus seems to have intended for his

test to invite further research rather than pre-empt it.
In his book Political Control of the Economy (1978),

l

Edward Tufte

looks for evidence of electoral-economic cycles on the supply side (the
manipulation and timing of policy instruments and therefore of business
cycles) and the demand side (the effect of macro aggregates on votes
cast for the incumbent president and/or his party) and claims to find

J

evidence of both.
a PBC,

Since this paper focuses on the supply-side aspects of

I will ignore Tufte's work on the demand side for now.
9

Tufte's

work on the supply side involves nothing more complicated than the
computation of various totals and averages for annual economic data.
In one table,

Tufte displays the variations in the inflation -

unemployment tradeoff in relation to presidential election years in the
31 years from 1946 to 1976.

Judging from his findings,

the economy

performs a good deal better during presidential election years t~an in
all other years.

IJpdating the data through 1985 and fitting the resu l ts

into a table identical to Tufte's,
Yearly change in unemployment
rate and inflation (GNP
deflator:

we get:
(Percentage of)
Presidential
election years

(Percentage of)
All other years

less unemployment
and less inflation

50Y. (5 years)

l3Y. (4 years)

less unemployment,
hut more inflation

lOY. (1 year)

33Y. (10 years)

less inflation,
but more unemployment

30Y. (3 years)

37Y. (11 years)

more inflation
and mnre unemployment

lOY. (1 year)

l7Y. (5 years)

100Y.

lOOY.

"It is apparent that the way to defeat the trade-off between
inflation and unemployment is to hold a presidential election"
-Edward Tufte 20
Unlike the Nordhaus test on page 9,

l

Tufte's table is little changed

by the addition of observations from 1977-85.
when the economy was beset by oil shocks,

And,

excluding 1980

there has never been a

presidential election year in which the rates of inflation and
unemployment both increased relative to the previous year.
Tufte identifies the annual growth rate of real disposable income
per capita as the economic variable that most affects the share of votes
receiv~d

by the president and his party,

and he looks at annual data for

this variable in analyzing patterns on the supply side as well.
10

This is

a mistake,

because even though public-policy actions may well influence

changes in real disposable income (RDI),

the government clearly has no

precise knowledge of or control over the future population level.
Nonetheless,

Tufte shows that movements in per-capita RDI are indeed

closely correlated with on-year and off-year (midterm) elections.
the years 1946-1976,

Over

the median growth rate of RDI per capita has averaged

3.3% in years when an incumbent president sought re-election,
to Just 1.7% in all other years.21

Furthermore,

excluding the Eisenhower years (because,

as compared

over the same timespan,

according to Tufte,

Eisenhower' s

was the one postwar Administration that genuinely reJected stimulative
interventionist policies),

Tufte finds the following median growth rates

for per-capita RDI:22
Years with
no election
Median
rate

1.5%

On-year election,
incumbent not
running

Midterm
election

On-year election,
incumbent running

2.8%

2.0%

Tufte's findings for unemployment data are similar.

Plotting

seasonally adJusted monthly unemployment rates for the terms of all
presidents from Truman through Ford and again excluding the Eisenhower
years,

we see that unemployment was moving downward before five of the

six remaining presidential elections.

Including the Eisenhower years,

unemployment was moving upward after seven of eight elections.
Given these fluctuations in per-capita RDI and the unemployment
rate,

Tufte writes,

"The electoral cycle causes substantial

macroeconomic fluctuations. "23

As Tufte should know,

coincidence does not always imply causality,
statement with the grain of salt it deserves.
distinction,

however,

so we should take this
Yet~

despite this

the coincidences Tufte reports are impressive:

-- A two-year cycle in the growth of real disposable income per
11

capita, with accelerations in even-numbered years [election years)
and deceleartions in odd-numbered years.
-- A four-year presidential cycle in the unemployment rate, with
downturns in unemployment [0£ about one percentage point) in the
months before the president~al election and upturns in the
unemployment rate rof nearly two percentage points] usually
beginning from twelve to eighteen months after the election. 24
According to Tu£te,
instruments.

the two cycles involve dif£eren~ policy

The two-year cycle "is especially the product bf election -

year increases in transfer payments,
the timing of beneficiary payments,

administrative messing around with
and decreases or postponements of

taxes ... The sur.cess£ul maintenance of the two-year real income cycle
is not much morp subtle than getting a lot of checks in the mail
before the first Tuesday in November. "25

Tu£te displays some interesting

circumstantial evidence of the "heaping" of transfer payment s around
October or

Novemb~r

in four recent election years.

He also finds that

of the thirtpen increases in Social Security benefits since 1950,
of them have come in election years; moreover,
benefit increases have been
of-year increases,

within~year

nine

eight of those nine

increases rather than beginning -

whereas three of the four benefit increases in odd-

numbered years came at the beginning of the year in January. 26
Tufte provides less evidence to support his contention that
politicians engender a four-year presidential cycle as well.

l

He reports

that such a cycle is more unwieldy than the , two-year congressional cycle
because the unemployment rate "is af£ected by fiscal and monetary
policies that act more slowly and with more uncertain time lags on
unemployment than do taxes and transfers on real disposable income. "27
Aside from some political science/psychology theory to explain why
government bureaucrats and opposition members o£ Congress would
cooper~te

however,

with a presidential-election-year economic stimulatLon,
the only evidence Tufte provides of policy· manipulation on this
12

front is a table of biennial changes in the growth rate of Ml.

He

reports that the relatioship between these changes in the money supply
and presidential elections is a strong one,

~s

the table below

(reproduced from Tufte) indicates:
CHANGES IN M1, TWO-YEAR PERIODS, 1948-1976 28
(excluding the Eisenhower years)
Biennial periods
Prior to the
pres. election

After the
pres. election

Rate of growth of
Ml increased

4

1

Rate of" growth of
M1 decreased

1

4

As strong as this evidence appears,

it may be somewhat spurious,

principally because the government's ability to control accelerations
and decelerations of the growth rate rate of M1 is in some doubt.

Also,

the money stock is a target of monetary policy, not an instrument of
policy.

(The aggregate level of bank reserves and the federal funds

rate are examples of monetary policy instruments. 29 )
manipulations of,

say,

Perhaps assessing the

the level of non-borrowed reserves in the

banking system in relation to presidential election cycles would be a
more illuminating test of monetary policy.
The most comprehensive work on the subJect of PBC's has been by

l
U

Bruno Frey of Switzerland.

Frey postulates two equations,

a popularity

function (by which popularity is influenced by the rates of
unemployment,

inflation and RDI growth, as well as personal factors) and

a reaction function which takes into account the proximity of the next
election and the popularity rating of the president in order to predict
government behavior.

I will concentrate on Frey's reaction function for

13

now.
In contrast to the vote - maximizing theory that Nordhaus assumes,
Frey and Schneider (1978) hypothesize that presidents follow a more
In addition they assume that a

realistic vote-satisficing strategy.

president derives his utility from pursuing his ideological goals.

The

need to be re-elected is seen as a constraint on the implementation of
this ideology rather than as an end in itself.
acknowledge,

however,

Frey and Schneider

that the desire to remain in power is the most

important constraint on politicians' behavior; and thus they hypothesize
that if a president's approval rating 30 is below a certain threshold level,
the

pre~ident

will undertake expansionary policies so as to raise his

popularity level and thereby secure his re-election.

Although the 22nd

Amendment to the Constitution prevents any president from serving more
than two terms,

the authors maintain that even second term presidents

"are under strong pressure from their party to pursue policies

they were seeking another term.

~

if

This is an attempt to ensure that their

successor will be a member of their own party. "31
Frey and Schneider arbitrarily set the target popularity rating

(POP * ) sought by presidents at the constant level of 5BX and talk of a
"state of popularity deficit" equal to (actual popularity rating - POP*)
that occurs when actual popularity (POP) is less than the target level.
Assuming further that the government will react more strongly to a large

l'

popularity deficit than to a small one,

they use the squared popularity

deficit as an explanatory variable in their reaction function.
entire reaction function is as follows:
GXCt)

=

POGXCt-4)

+

(constant)

+

P1(government receipts)

+

P2Cpopularity deficit)2

+

P3Ctime before elections)
14

The

+

P4(each president's ideology)

+

u(t)

where GX = total nondefense federal expenditures (nominal,
of dollars); time before elections

= dummy

in the first half and takes the values

variable,

1,2~3,

TBE,

in billions
which equals 0

•.. ,8 starting with the

beginning o£ the second half of each presidential term (TBE
POP> POp*); ideology

=

=0

if

(POP - POP*)2 if (POP> POP*)

and equal s 0 if (POP ~ POp*).

Frey and Schneider estimate similar

reaction functions for the level of transfer payments and the number of
federal Jobs as well.
Their estimation of the above reaction function for GX,
quarterly data from 1953/11 to 1975/11,
and P3"

yield~

using

positive values for P2

The positive signs conform with Frey's and Schneider's

theoretical expectations (of a government that reacts to a popularity
deficit or an impending election by applying a fiscal

but the

st~mulus),

estimated values for both coefficients are so low as to be economically
-- if not statisti.cally - - insignificant. 32

The tiny value for P2

presents no challenge to election-oriented PBC theory,

however,

because the

popularity dpfi.ctt variable includes observations from all sixteen
quarters of each presidential term,

rsther than being restricted to

observation points shortly before each election.

Thus it implicitly

tests for the ex{~tence of a "popularity maintenance function"33,

in

which a president attempts a fiscal stimulus whenever his popularity
rating is low,
election.

regardless of the relative proximity of the next

This seems unlikely to begin with,

not only because the costs

of such an irresponsible policy would seem to outweigh the benefits if
the next election were far off, but also because, as Sulock points out,
a decrease in popularity "may weaken the ability of a president to alter

15

[this instrument1 since presidential power is also a function of ...
popularity. "34
The low value for P3'

which predicts an increase of Just $0.37

billion in domestic federal spending in response to a popularity deficit
in the latter half of a presidential term,

is more problematical.

But

the problem may well be with Frey's and Schneider's model rather than an
absence of policy manipulation.
misspecified,

The dependent variable GX seems

in particular because its failure to

inflation or the size of the economy.

Moreover,

adJu~t

either for

they do not attempt a

reaction function for federal tax collections (or the average tax rate),
the other half of fiscal policy.
instruments.

Nor do they attempt to combine the two

Thus it is possible that if some periodic electorally -

inspired cycle does exist in the use of fiscal policy instruments,
Frey' s and Schneider's model would not pick it up.
Furthermore, Frey himself cautions that "[tJhe approach of
examining raw data over time is seriously defi~ient.

A careful

empirical study requires an isolation of the electoral cycle:

all

influence s not connected with it must be excluded," or else the results
either way may be spurious. 35

Indeed, failure to account for such

exogenous factors as wars and supply shocks is likely to obscure one' s

I
f

[

results considerably.
In a 1.983 article Kabir Ahmad makes several incisive criticisms of
Frey's and Schneider's reaction functions and estimates two policy
functions of his own, one for fiscal policy and one for monetary policy.
The

respecti~e

policy instruments he examines are

th~

real high

employment (or "structural") budget deficit divided by real GNP
CRHEBD/GNP) and the rate of growth of Ml.

In addition, his model

contains three explanatory variables for the state of the economy -- the
16

lagged values of rea l income,

unemployment a nd inflation -- as we ll as

the lagged values of the particular policy instruments themselves
(Pet-I».

By including these economic variables, Ahmad seems to be

heeding Prey's warning that one needs to isolate the electoral cycl e
from all exogenous factors in order to conduct a proper PSC test.
The two reaction functions that Ahmad does introduce are otherwise
quite similar to Prey's and Schneider's.
uses for e ach policy equation are:

The explanatory variab les he

a constant term; the lagged (by one

quarter) values of the rates of inflation,
growth; the lagged popularity deficit,

unemployment and real GNP

PO; the lagged popularity

surplus ( s eparated from PO in order to focus on PO); and a disturbance
term.
Unfortunately,

Ahmad does not include a time-before-elections

variable of any kind; thus the critical coefficient values in both tests
are those of the popularity deficit,

the theoretical improbability of

which I have already discussed. He hypothesizes that the coefficient
s ign of PD in the fiscal policy equation will be positive and that the
coefficient s ign of PO in the monetary test will be interdeterminate,
because the central bank might choose to assert its independence in the
face of executive pressure or because the president might prefer a tight
money policy so that inflation will be low at election time.
Performing regressions on his own model and Frey's and Schneider' s

L

1978 model,
1978,

and expanding the data series from to 1953-1975 to 1948-

Ahmad shows Prey's and Schneider's model to be extremely sensitive

to the sa mple period selected.
manner,

After expanding the timeframe in this

th e R2 of their GX model drops from 0.99 to 0.50.

Ahmad

reports that hi s own mode l of fiscal policy gives much better results,
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since he gets a higher R2 (0.80,

or 0.83 when the ideological

dummy variables are included in the regression) and statistically
significant coefficient estimates for income growth,
and the lagged endogenous variable P(i)(t-l).
results for his monetary reaction function,

popularity deficit

He reports satisfactory

when presidential dummies

are included -- an R2 of 0.60 and significant coeffic~ent values for
inflation,

unemployment,

variable PCii)Ct-1).

popularity deficit and the lagged endogenous

The coefficient estimate for PO in the money

supply equat.ion is negat.ive,

however.

Taken together,

Ahmad's t.wo

react.ion functions imply that a president with a popularity shortfal l
will pursue an expansionary fiscal policy and a contractionary monet.ary
policy.
Not only does it seem unlikely that. a president would choose to
undertake two po l icies that cancel each other out,

but Ahmad does not

make any attempt to explain why this might be the case.
like Frey and Schneider,

In addi t ion,

he does not discuss the economic significance

of his respective estimates for PO -- 0.00002 and -0.063 -- aside from
noting that they are statistically significant at the 51 level.
estimate for the fiscal equation seems slight:
roughly $1.5 trillion (its 1983

~alue

The PD

assuming that GNP is

in 1972 doLlars),

then a president.

with a ten-point popularity deficit will react by increasing the
structural deficit by $300 million,

l

a trifling amount when one considers

that the st.ructural deficit is measured in billions.

The PO estimate

for monetary policy appears a good deal more significant,

but Ahmad's

explanations for why it could be negative are not convincing.

If

"office - motivated" presidents pursue contractionary policies in order to
improv~

their immediate popularity,

then they are irrational,

because

the rates of "unemployment and growth of income together [have] by far a
18

greater impact on presidential popularity than [does) inflation. "36
The "popularity maintenance theory" implied by the popularity
deficit variables in Frey's and Schneider's and Ahmad's models seems so
unlikely in terms of cost - benefit analysis (see page 17) and receives so
little supporting evidence in the empirical testing of these models 37
that this paper will consider it no further.
A 1986 paper by stuart Allen tests econometrically whether or not
a periodic politj.cal cycle exists in monetary policy-making.

In

separate regressions he uses one of two dependent variables:

the first

difference of the log , of the monetary base, and the growth rate of MI.
Using ten different specifications of electoral dummy variables, so as
to allow for a number of possible electorally-motivated policy cycles,
Allen runs separate regressions for four different (but overlapping)
time periods and for each of the ten electoral variables.

Allen's

results for all forty regressions are so unimpressive that he concludes
no evidence exists for an electoral cycle in the growth of MI.
Allen reports more positive results for a second specification,
which indicates that the Fed's willingness to monetize the public debt
varies with the presidential and congressional election cycles.

His

model includes terms for the change in net federal debt (DEBT) and an
election cycle-debt interaction term (EVDEBT), equal to the electoral
dummy times the debt variable.

He reports positive coefficients for

DEBT and negative coefficients for EVDEBT,
signs,

and statistically significant

v~lues

the theoretically expected
for those coefficients.

He

concludes:
The results provide evidence that the Federal Reserve not only
accommodates Treasury borrowing regardless of the electoral season,
but also provides extra accommodation prior to presidential and
congressional elections. 38
19

The coeff i cient estimates of EVDEBT that correspond to Allen's
specifications of a two-year cycle are a good deal larger than those
corresponding to a four - year cycle.

Hence the indirect link that Allen

sees between monetary accommodation and national elections may be
stronger for congressiona l elections than for presidential elections.
My own test will consider both possibilities as well.
After going over some of the most often cited
literatlJre,

~orks

in PBC

my strongest conclusion is that these works tend to be long

on theory and short on solid evidence of a PBC, despite their authors'
contentions.
best,

As Su l ock puts it,

too often "the induced changes are,

'economically non-negligible. ,"39

in such macroaggregates as real GNP,

at

The results pertaining to changes

RDI and the unemployment rate in

relation to electoral cycles seem a good deal more revealing than the
estimated reactions of policy instruments to elections.
asymmetry,

however,

aspects of a PBC,

Desp i te this

in my own work I will try to analyze both of these

because the latter would seem to be the most likely

cause of the former.

Theoretical Framework
Although my empirical tests will allow for the possibjlity of a
two-year congressiona l economic cycle,

I will be focusing mai nl y bn the

possible existence of a four-year "presidential business cycle."
Despite Tufte's findings that ROI per capita grew much faster in midterm
election years than in years with no election at all,
true that since 1947,
, 58,

l

year,

, 70,

it is nonetheless

there have been five midterm election years ( 1954,

' 74 and ' 82) in which real GNP declined from the previous

as opposed to only one presidential election year (1980) in which

the same occurred.

Also,

if such a cycle involves manipulating the
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short-run Phillips curves to any extent, as I assume it would,

two years

seems far too short a time period in which to complete any such cycle.
There are three basic assumptions underlying my theory of a
presidential business cycle:

1) voters base

thei~

electoral decisions

largely on the economic conditions at election time; 2) politicians have
some ability to manipulate the economy through fiscal· and monetary
policy; 3) a president's first duty (to paraphrase Adlai Stevenson) is
to get re - elected or to see his party's nominee elected president.

In

the following pages I will explore these assumptions in greater depth.

1. Voters base their eleotoral deoisions .largely on the eoonomio
If politicians did not believe this were

oonditions at eleotion time.
true,

they would have little incentive to stimulate the economy before

an electi.on.

Fortunately for PBC theorists,

levels and movements of economic

vari~bles

the evidence suggests that

have a profound impact on

electoral outcomes.
Ray Fair (1975) found that voters apply an infinite discount rate
in assessi.ng the economic performance of prior presidential
administrations.

That is to say,

they consider only the past four-year

performance of the economy under the current administration in rendering

I

their decision.

Furthermore,

after testing fourteen different economic

LJ

variables as possible explanatory variables for the incumbent party's
share of the two-party vote in presidential contests, Fair writes,
growth rate of real per capita GNP, gi'

"The

in the year of the election

[emphasis added] was definitely the best measure of economic performance
in terms of explaining" the vote share. 40

For the time period 1916-1972,

gi explains 7B.4Y. of the variance in vote share (i.e., R2

= 0.784).

Thus Fair's results imply that voters are myopic to an extreme -- they
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consider only the events of the most recent year of the current
administration.
In constructing his model of voting behavior,

Fair assumed that 1)

"voters hold presidential administrations accountable for economic
events" and 2) a voter bases his or her expectation of the future
economic performance of the incumbent party's candidate on some measure
of his party's past economic performance. 41

Both of these assumptions

seem plausible enough to incorporate into my own underlying theory; and,
applying Fai-r's above conclusions,
to be:

we can extend the second assumption

a voter bases his or her expectations of the futtire economic

performance of the incumbent party's candidate on the economic events of
the election year.
These assumptions go against the "rational expectations" hypothesis
which holds that "people form their expectations on the basis of all
information,

including any available information on the probable future

"
1.
"42 - - b
" bl e
ae t 10ns
o.f po I"lcyma~ers
u t l b e 1"1eVe th ey f orm a p 1
aUSl
description of voting behavior.
noted,

For

on~

thing,

as Chris Goodrich has

"the average voter is not a sophisticated econometrician" and is

not able "to estimate the profile of the economy over the electoral
term.

Moreover,

he is also not able to distinguish between government -

induced actions and other influences upon the economy" such as supply
1.
43
s h oc~s.

In addition,

it seems unreasonable to expect voters who

haven't taken a macro theory course to understand the dynamic properties
of short- and long-run Phillips curves - - that is,

for them to know that

today's hi-gh growth rate may be tomorrow's inflation.

And given the

relative insignificance of one individual's vote in a presidential
e lection (where the average margin of victory in postwar times has been
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roughly eight million votes),

the benefit one would derive from

obtaining and learning to interpret all available economic information
in order to vote "correctly" seems negligible compared to the costs of
acquiring this information.
In addition,

Frey claims his statistical estimates reveal that the

voters' time horizon rarely goes back much further than one year in any
country.

Goodrich comments that

such empirical studies as have been undertaken, both outside and
through the popularity function over a broad range of countries and
time, have shown that the electorate tends to be myopic.
It has an
incredibly short memory, and tends to be remarkably ignorant about
the state of economic affairs ••• 44
In support of these claims, one might note that in the postwar U.S.,
real GNP declined during the second or third years of six presidential
terms,

yet the incumbent president won re-election in four out of these

six cases.

By contrast,

the incumbent president's party has never

retained control of the White House in a postwar preSidential election
year in which real GNP grew at a rate of less than 2.1 percent.
Tufte and Frey also report a strong connection between favorable
economic news and votes for the incumbent presidential candidate.
Running a multiple reression,

Tufte gets significant coefficient

estimates indicating that every 1.0X annual increaSe in per-capita ROI
during the election year brings the incumbent party's nominee an extra
1.3X of the popular vote.

Frey's "popularity function" also takes the

form of a multiple regression,

L

in which presidential popularity depends

on the current rates of unemployment cuct»

and ROl growth (GCt»

and

the lagged value of the inflation rate CICt - 1», as well as dummy
variables for each president's base popularity level and popularity
depreciation rate and an additionally dummy variable for the Watergate
years (1973-74).

Frey gets a value of corrected R2 of 0.9 and
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theoretically "correct" signs for the coefficients of U(t), G(t) and
l(t-1).

His estimates of these coefficients suggest that:

1) a 1Y.

increase in unemployment causes popularity to drop by four percentage
points; 2) a lY. increase in inflation causes popularity to drop by four
percentage points; and 3) a 1Y. increase in the growth rate of ROI raises
popularity by 0.5 percent. 45
Taken together,

Fair's, Tufte's and Frey's results provide almost

overwhelming evidence that economic conditions are a key factor in
explaining the outcomes of presidential elections.
2.

Politicians have some ability to manipulate the economy

through fiscal and monetary policy_

Keynesian economics takes for

granted that fiscal and monetary policy are within the control of
government policy-makers.

Although the government's policie s do not

creat e the business cycle,

Keynesians assert,

their actions certainly

have an impact upon business cycles and macroaggregates.
the directly competing school of thought,

Monetarism,

charges that the private

economy is inherently stable and that most if not all fluctuations in
economic

performanc~

-- that is to say, business cycles -- are

directly traceable to governmental

int~rvention.

The point I am

trying to make is that both camps agree that governmental policy
actions have a potent effect on the economy.

For the most part,

this

is not a controversial issue.
To go one step further as I do in assuming that politicians
(rather than unelected bureaucrats), and presidents in particular,
direct these economic policies invites somewhat more debate.
policy,

Fiscal

although it is embodied in the federal budget which Congress

passes and the President signs into law,
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inevitably reflects the

prioritl.es of the Congress and not only those of the President, since
it is Congress that votes for the final budget,

which may differ quite

drastically from the President's original proposal.
in the hands of a supposedly independent,

Monetary policy is

non-partisan Federal Reserve

Board of Governors that sets its own priorities.

These seem to me to

be the principal obJections to Assumption 2, and I will deal with them
summarily in the following paragraphs.
Before explaining why presidents exert such a strong influence on
fiscal policy,

I feel it necessary to explain how I am defining fiscal

policy and why politicians are conscious of it.

Fiscal policy involves

total federal expenditures as measured against total federal tax
receipts.

Since downturns in the economy automatically result in

reduced tax collections (because there is less national income to tax)
and,

to a smaller extent,

increased government outlays, and economic

upturns result in Just the opposite,

the federal budget deficit has

what is called a cyclical component.

Changes in the level of this

comporient occur naturally in response to economic fluctuations,
a calcu l ated reaction on the government's part.

not as

Thus the correct

measure of actual fiscal policy, many economists would agree,

is the

"high-employment" or "structural" federal deficit - - the estimated
level what the deficit would be if the economy were operating at "high
employment." i.e.

the lowest sustainable unemployment rate that would

not generate any new inflation.

Estimates of the structural

defici~

are calculated officially by the Oepartment of Commerce and
unofficially by the Office of Management and Budget and the
Congressional Budget Office; they were incorporated formally into the
budget in 1972. 46
Because the budget that Congress passes contains an estimated
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measure of fiscal policy,

it seems reasonable to assume that

politicians have some awareness of the relative size of a particular
fiscal st.imulus.
years,

Even prior to 1972, at least in the post-Eisenhower

politicians have seemed to know that a countercyclical fiscal

policy is better than a procyclicalone (such as the tax increase that
President Hoover enacted in 1932 during the Depression).
Paul Samuelson,

Presidents Kennedy,

Nixon,

According to

Ford and Carter all accepted

the precept that the budget should be set "so that it can be financed
by the tax revenues that a would be generated from a high-level full employment economy. "47

Judging from published figures for the actual

and structural deficits during the 1950s,

it appears that the

Eisenhower Administration's primary fiscal obJective (especially in
election years) was to maintain a balanced budget.

For this reason,

my

econometric tests of the manipulation of fiscal policy will include one
specification in which all observations from the Eisenhower years are
excluc;fed.
Because the postwar norm in American politics has been a
Republican president and a Democratic-controlled Congress,

one might

question the influence that I ascribe to presidents in shaping fiscal
policy.

l

T believe,

however,

that partisan control of Congress limits a

president's ability to conduct short-term economic policy considerably
less than it limits his ability to achieve other obJectives,

~GW@i~F1 }Julie1

SRil

domestic social policy goals.

Moreover,

such as
since

Representatives are up for re-election every two years and Senators
every six years,

and assuming that they are no less interested in their

own re-elections than the President is in his,

they may well be

inclined to go along with any fiscal stimUlus that the President
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proposes,

even if they belong to the opposition party.

After a ll,

fiscal stimuli such as income tax cuts and spending programs affecting
one's constituency are politically popular.
political self-interest,

Applying Downs's theory of

it seems fair to postUlate that opposition

members of Congress make their own re-elections a higher priority than
they do the President's defeat.

And studies have shown that members of

Congress who belong to the same party as the President benefit from
election-year economic booms in their own re-election attempts. 48
Examples of presidents inducing an opposition-controlled Congress
to accept a fiscal stimulus include the tax reductions of 1958,
~nd

1981,

under Republican Presidents Eisenhower,

respectively.

I n the first two cases,

1975

Ford and Reagan,

the Democrats had maJorities in

both hou ses of Congress; in the third case,
maJority in the House of Representatives.

they had a commanding
Moreover,

president is not in full control of fiscal policy,

even if a

he still ha s the

power to veto any spending or tax bill that Congress passes.

And

despite the fact that the budget that a president proposes each year is
not always the same on e th a t Congress enacts,

the difference s between

the proposed and final budgets probably have more to do with
conflicting spending priorities (i.e.,
the military,

how to allocate the budget among

social programs, entitlements, etc.) than with

disagreements as to the proper level of the structural deficit.
Tufte describes the "collaboration" of presidents and opposition
members of Congress, even opposition candidates for president,

in

e lection-year economic stimulations as follows:

J

Even those not in power become implicated in election - year
upturns.
During the election campaign, nonincumbent candidates
find themselves in the ironic postures of advocating stimulative
economic policies as correctives for what they attack as the
failed policies of the incumbent [administration].
Incumbents,
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proc l aiming they are also keeping a keen e~e on inflation and
government spending, are happy to oblige. 4
Tufte cites as an

e~ample

Social Security benefits,

of this pattern the 20 percent increase in
effective October 1,

1972,

Nixon signed into law in the election year 1972.
proposed a 5 percent increase,

in late 1971.

that President

Nixon had origina l ly

During the primary

election campaign the following spring, several of the Democratic
candidates proposed upping the increase to 20 or 25 percent.
both

(D~mnGratic-controlled)

increase,

In July,

houses of Congress passed a 20 percent

despite hints of a presidential veto. 50

A similar example

occurred during the Truman Administration early in the election year
when Truman enacted a tax cut bill passed by a Republican

1948,

Congress after having vetoed two tax reduction bills the previous
year. 5l
In short,

i t seems h i ghly plausible that opposition members of

Congress would not only go along with a president's attempts at
election-y~ar

fiscal stimulation,

but that they might even initiate

such an attempt.
As for monetary policy,

numerous economists

h~ve

questioned the

degree to which the Fed is really independent of the political process.
The Federal Reserve Board,

as we know,

consists of seven governors,

all

appointed to staggered fourteen-year terms by the President with the

l

advice and consent of the Senate.

[

office,

Although fourteen years i s

considerably longer than the legal limit of a president's tenure in

t .. e

most Board members retire before half of their fourteen-year

. ~ \Jfl.52
rm 1""

years;

In addition,

the

Chairm~rt's

term as chairman is only four

giving each President the opportunity to appoint a chairman of

his own choosing.

Thomas Mayer states that "the President and Congress
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have considerable influence over the Fed" and gives four reasons why
this is so:
One source of the government' s influence is moral suasion; the
governors are reluctant to oppose the views of the one person
elected by the whole nation; they go along if they feel they can
do so without dereliction of duty.
Second, the Fed is continually
active in Congress, trying to obtain certain legislation or to
hlock other legislation.
It wants the support of the President in
thes e legislative struggles, and hence has an incentive to keep on
goorl terms with him.
Third, the Chairman wants the President's
goodwill, so that when the President appoints a new governor, it
wi]] he someone the chairman prefers .•..
Moreover, to ward off
undesired legislation and to obtain the legislation it does want,
the Federal Reserve probably bends at least to some extent to
Congressional pressures. 53
Ever s ince it established the Fed in 1913, Congress traditiona l ly
ha s played a "watchdog" role in supervising its activities.

Th e

operational guidelines it gave the Fed were exceedingly vague up until
recently,

powe~

but it ha s always had the

to enact laws altering th e

Fed's charter or curtailing the Fed's independence.
such legislatio n is
change of policy

st~ong

(assumin~,

enough,

then

of course,

th~

If the threat of

Fed may be forced into a

that the Fed, as a bureaucracy,

derives its utility from staying as powerful and autonomou s as
possible).

Furthermore,

since 1975,

the Chairman of the Board of

Governors js required to appear twice a year before Congress to state
and explain his annual growth targets for Mi,

M2 and M3,

thu s making

Congressiona l supervision of monetary policy more direct.
Sherman Maisel,

a former member of the Board of Governors,

once

estimated the distribution of power over Fed policy among outsiders as:

L

presidential administration - 351; Congress - 251; the press,
economists,

l obbyists and the general p~blic - 201; financial interests

- ]0%; foreign intere~ts - 51; other regulatory agencies - 5%.54
Mai se l be l ieves the President and Congress together exert a potent
influence on monetary policy.
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His estimates do not compare the

Thus

relative influence of these outsiders to that of Fed insiders,

but a

1978 paper by Robert Weintraub provides compelling evidence of the
active role that presidential regimes play in monetary policy - making .
Weintraub constructs several measures of monetary "thrust" -- a
concept that is explained further following the table below -- year by
year from 1951 to 1977.

He finds that

the Federal Reserve shifted course in the fundamenta l sense,
easi ng or t i.ghten i ng significantly in 1953, 1961, 1.971., 1.974 an d
1977.
Except for 1971., these were the only years when the
PresidencY , changed hands.
Considering further that the thrust of
monetary policy, which began to ease in 1961, eased significantly
during Johnsori's presidency from its first year (1964>, it may be
reasonably urged that the dominant force behind monetary policy is
the President. 55
Weintraub further supports this claim with a table of monetary
policy thrust in the presidencies of this timeframe.

I have reproduced

this table in the space below:
MONETARY POLICY THRUST IN EACH PRESIDENT'S TERM,
President
(1)

Dates of term
(2 )

Truman
Eisenhower
Kennedy
;Johnson
Nixon
Ford
Carter

l

1951-1977

(3 )
3/51
1/53
1/61

(4 )

-

-

11/63
1/69 8/74
1/77

Thrl.lst 1.

=

Thrust 2
Thrust 3

=
=

Thrust. 4

=

-

-

12/52
12/60
10/63
12/68
7/74
12/76
11/77

4.75
1. 73
2.31
4.78
6.17
4.76
6.61

0.80
-2.32
-1. 82
0.77
2. 11
0.53
2.41

0.81
-2.30
-1. 78
0.82
2. 18
0.61
2.50

0.77
-2.28
-1.. 71
0.79
2.17
0.74
2.59

Average percent change in Ml, from monthly data,
annual ;rate
Thrust 1. - r4.0 + 0.0625(Ut ~ 1 - 4)]
Thrust 1 - [4.0 + 0.0625(U t _ l - 4
+ time*O.003115*1.5)]
Thrust 1. - [4.0 + 0.0625(logU t _ 1
- 10g(4 + time*0.003115*1.5)]

at

Thrust 2 allows for countercyclical money-growth policY , as regards
unemployment (U t - 1 ).
It assumes that 4.0 is the structual or
"natural" unemployment rate.
The coefficient 0.0625 is three
times the maximum fraction of the unemployed in excess of 4
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percent that the economy can absorb in one month, according to
Okun's Law.
Thrust 3 recognizes that the structural unemployment rate may have
risen steadily over the given timeframe, from 4.0X in March 1951
(where time = 1) to 5.5X in November 1977 (time = 321).
Thrust 4 uses logarithms so as nto allow for absorbing higher
fractions of the unemployed in excess of the [structural]
unemployment rate as unemployment increases. n56
Whichever measure of thrust one looks at,

however,

the inescapable

conclusion one draws from Weintraub' s table is that monetary policy
changed significantly with the advent of every new postwar presidential
administration.
Weintraub adds,

Not only did it change with successive presidenci es,
hut n[eJxamination of the economic and financial

histori es of the administrations of ••• Truman and his successors
show[s] that in each administration monetary policy fitted harmoniously
with the President's economic and financial obJecti.ves and plans. n57
Despite this evidence,

however,

the separate contention that the

Fed responds to an administration's electoral "priorities has yet to be
thoroughly tested,

let alone proven.

attempt to test this cl a im.

For now,

My own empirical work will
the relevant question i s whether

or not politicians exert some control over monetary policy-making
(as in Assumption 2 ); and I believe the above evidence suggests they
do.
Few doubt that fiscal and monetary policy, together and even
separately, have a pronounced impact on the U.S.

l

however,

economy.

It is true,

that the magnitude of this impact at any point in time will vary

considerably with the prior economic and national conditions.
of war,

In times

fiscal and monetary policies tend to be oriented towards

providing maximum support for the war effort.

Examples of such include

the interest-rate pegging during World War II and the Korean War and
the large federal deficits of the Vietnam era.
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In addition,

upward

shifts in the short - run Phillips curves exacerbate the unemployment inflation tradeoff,
effective.

making policy manipulation more costly and less

Where appropriate,

my own PBC test models will include

explanatory variables for the Korea and Vietnam War years,
for quarterly changes in the Producer Price Index,

as well as

which appear to be

highly correlated with supply shocks and other fa6tors causing shifts
in the i ntercept of the SP curve.

~.

party's

A president's first duty is to get re-elected or to see his
nomin~ .... lected

president.

Whether one assumes that a

president derives his utility primarily from seeing hi s party's nominee
elected president in the next election (as does Nordhaus) or that the
need to be re-elected Cor to anoint a successor) is simply a powerful
constraint on a president's pursuit of utility (as do Frey and
Schneider),

it is indispensable for PBC theorists to assume that a

president strongly desires that his party's nominee be elected.
A model of a presidential utility function seems to be in order.
The one that I have postulated reveals my own assumptions about
presidential utility to be closer to Frey's and Schneider's than to
Nordhaus's,

l
l

in that I view the need to win elections as an overriding

constraint on utility rather than as an end in itself.

The distinction

may seem a fuzzy one, but it will become pertinent as we move on.

The

model is as follows:
UTILITY pres

= fCIDEOLOGY,

POPULARITY,

LEGACY)

subJect to
ACELECTION,

INFLUENCE, NATIONAL MOOD)

with all explanatory variables given in descendirig order of their
importance.

A further constraint on presidential utility is the degree
32.

to which a president's goals of implementing his ideological obJectives
(IDEOLOGY),

maintaining high approval ratings (POPULARITY) and being

well - remembered by history (LEGACY) conflict with each other, as they
may.

The ELECTION constraint seems the strongest because if the

president's party cannot maintain control of the White House after the
next election,

his ideologically-driven accomplishments may well be

nullified by the next administration.

The INFLUENCE constraint is

itself a function of 1) the partisan and ideological composition of the
House and Senate, since one would expect that,

ceteris paribus, a

president will be more likely to get what he wants legislatively from a
Congress controlled by like-minded members of his own party than from
an opposition-dominated Congress; and 2) the president's approval
rating, since a popular president would presumably have an easier time
setting the national agenda than an unpopUlar one.
constraint refers,

The NATIONAL MOOD

at any point in time, to the relative receptivity of

the general public to certain ideologically-motivated programs and ideas
for instance,

national health insurance, a balanced-budget amendment,

or incrp.ased defense spending.
express quantitatively,

l
L

As difficult as this model would be to

it nevertheless has important implications for

PSC testing, as the following paragraphs will reveal.
The assumption that the ELECTION constraint is so strong as to be
overriding means that theoretically we still have an "office - motivated"
president,

but that a president whose approval rating is above the

"threshold level" that Frey and Schneider speak of will no longer be
office-motivated.

Applying this toPBC theory,

we see that a highly

popular president would only attempt an election-year economic
stimulation if such a stimulus were in line with his ideological and
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other goals.

Because IDEOLOGY ranks highest among a president' s goals

in this model and because election-year economic growth peaks do not
seem a product of any particular ideology,

we can conclude that a

highly popular president would feel little need to manipulate the
business cycle so that it peaks at election time.
On the other hand,

the INFLUENCE constraint affect s not only a

president's ability to achieve his ideological goals but also hi s
ability to satisfy his re-election constraint through an economic
stimulus or by any other means.

Although INFLUENCE is assumed to

depend on the partisan and ideological composition of Congress and also
on the president's approval rating, on page 33 I theorized that
partisan control of Congress affects election - year economic policy
considerably less than it affects other areas of policy.
the making of election-year economic policy,

Hence,

in

presidential influence

comes to depend on the president's popularity.

The PBC models I will

be testing shall take this factor into account.
We can reasonably expect that the ELECTION constraint will be
greater when th e incumbent president, .rather than someone else,
party's nominee,

is his

since an incumbent president and a different

candidate are not perfect substitutes. 58

Another member of the

president's party is likely to have somewhat different ideological
goals than the president,

and a president can no longer derive utility

from POPULARITY after he has left office.

Also,

assuming that the

self-interest axiom entail s that presidents are more interested in

J

maximizing their own utility than in the long-term success of their
party,

it follows that a lame-duck president might prefer to pursue hi s

own ideblogical goal s rather than do everything he can to help someone
else get e lected president.

The ELECTION constraint still applies to
34

a lame-duck president,

but it is not nearly so strong as when the

president himself is running for re-election.
Combining the conclusions of these last three paragraphs,

we see

several reasons why a regular four-year presidential business cycle
would be theoretically unlikely.

The 22nd Amendment ensures that in

every other presidential election year (barring any deaths in office,

impeachments or resignations), an incumbent president will not be up
for re-election.

In addition, a president with a "popularity surplus"

will have scant need to stimulate the economy in the election year; and
a president with a severe popularity deficit will likely have
insufficient influence with which to persuade Congress and/or the Fed
to adopt expansionary policies in an election year.

I see no reason to

rule out the possibility of a four-year PBC altogether; but,
for these circumstances,

to account

my empirical work will include alternate tests

with dummy variables for "semi-popular incumbents" whose average third year approval ratings (as measured by the Gallup Opinion Index) lie in
the range

40r.<POP~bOy'

and whose willingness and ability to stimulate

the economy are unmitigated by any of the above factors.

Thus I will

test both for a "pure" four-year cycle, a test that involves a strict
~nterpretation

of Assumption 3, and for a PBC for semi-popular

incumbents.

l

The Models
In my empirical work I ran regressions for four different
dependent variables:
ROI; and,

percent change in real GNP; percent change in

on the policy-instruments side, the real structural deficit

divided by potential GNP and the percent
borrowed reserves.

chan~e

in the level of non -

The estimation method used in all cases was
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Ordinary Least Squares.

In all my regressions I used quarterly data

from the post-World War II era.
dummy variables,

All of these models rely heavily on

to distinguish between the performance of a dependent

variable during the pre-election quarters and during the post-election
quarters.

The use of dummy variables to represent all 16 quarters or

all four years of a presidential term eliminates the need for a
constant term.

Each dummy variable coefficient is itself a constant

term for a particular quarter or year of a presidential term.
In accordance with Tufte's claim that the Eisenhower
Administration reJected stimulative interventionist policies, al l of my
models include

alte~nate

specifications that omit all observations from

the Eisenhower years (1953-1960).
quarter of 1961 (1961/1).

Those models begin with the first

For simplicity's sake,

all model s that

include observations from the Eisenhower years will have an "an after
the equation numbers (e.g.,

Equation 1.1a) and all models that omit the

Eisenhower observations wi l l have a "b" after the equation numbers.
With the GNP and ROI models,
basic tests for each,

which are highly similar,

I ran three

using different sets of dummy variables.

first of these tests contains 16 dummy variables,

The

one to correspond

with each quarter of a presidential term. The second test instead uses
four yearly dummies.

l

The fourth-year dummy always represents a

presidentia l election year.

The third test also uses yearly dummies,

but features two different sets of fourth-year dummies:

one for years

in which a semi-popular incumbent (as defined on the previous page) is
running,

and another for years in which a semi-popular incumbent is not

running.

The GNP tests.
1986/II1.

These tests cover the timeframe 1948/11 to

The observations begin with 1948/Il because of limited data
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availabili ty.
The first equation takes the following form:

•

GNP

t

=

•

•

•

•

fCGNP _ , GNP _ , GNP _ , GNP _ , DUM1, DUM2,
t 1
t 3
t 4
t 2
DUM3, ... , DUM16, VIET, KOREA, PRICE)

( 1. 1 )

The last three independent variables are there to help account for the
economic fluctuations caused by wars and supply shocks and hence to
help avoid spurious results.
real GNP,

GNP

= the

at annual rates of growth.

presidential term,

percent changes in the level of

DUMl

=

the first quarter of a

in which the president is inaugurated; DUM2

second quarter; DUM3

=

the third quarter; and'so on.

annual change in total U.S.

VIET

=

=

the

the semi-

military personnel in South Vietnam; since

these are semi-annual changes and the GNP data are quarterly,

the value

of VIET will be the same for successive observations that are within
the same half-year (e.g.,

VIET

= 2305

for 1961/111 and 1961/IV, 6695

for 1962/1 and 1962/11, 2300 for 1962/111 and 1962/IV).
data was not readily available for U.S.

Since similar

involvement in the Korean War,

KOREA is a simple 0-1 dummy variable that equals 1 in all quarters in
which the U.S.

was a participant in the Korean War (1950/1 - 1953/111)

and equals 0 in all other quarters.

PRICE

=

quarterly average of

monthly percent changes iri the Producer Price Index for industrial

l
l
l

commodi ties.

The PRICE variable serves as a proxy for supply shocks;

this particular price index includes fuels and related products, and
changes in it appear to be highly correlated with recent supply shocks.
Since wars are supposed to boost real GNP growth and adverse supply
shocks are supposed to hinder real GNP growth, the expected
coefficients of VIET and KOREA are positive and the expected
coefficient of PRICE is negative.
According to PSC theory,
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the coefficients of the quarterly dummies

should be highest in the quarters directly before and including the
election.

Assumption 1 implies that the coefficients should be

highest in quarters 13 - 16, those of the election year,

in order for the

politicians to take full advantage of the voters' myopia.

In

accordance with the assumptions that voters have a decaying memory of
past events and that politicians can manipUlate the economy through
fiscal and monetary policy,

one would also exp·e ct higher GNP growth in

the third year (quarters 9 - 12) than in the first and second years
(quarters 1-8).
The s econd GNP test uses yearly dummies and takes the form
GNP t

=

where YEARl.

fCGNP t _ 1 , GNP t _ 2 , GNP t - 3 , GNP t - 4 , YEAR1,
YEAR2, YEAR3, YEAR4, VIET, KOREA, . PRICE)

=

1 for observations from quarters 1-4 of a presidential

term and 0 for quarters 5-16; YEAR2
others; YEAR3

( 1. 2)

=

1. for quarters 9-12,

=

1 for quarters 5-8, 0 for all

0 for ~ll others; YEAR4

=

1 for

quarters 13-16 and 0 for quarters 1-12.
The third GNP test differentiates between election years in which
a semi-popular incumbent is running (INCUM4) and all other election
years CORDYEAR4):
GNP t

=

f(GNPt_l.' GNP t _ 2 , GNP t - 3 , GNP t - 4 , YEAR1,
YEAR2, YEAR3, OROYEAR4, INCUM4, VIET, KOREA,

PRICE)

(1.3)

Of the ten presidential elections in the postwar U.S., four -- those of

l
l

1948,

1972, 1976 and 1984 - - involved a semi-popular incumbent.
The ROt tests.

The three ROI models are nearly identical in

specification to the GNP tests.

I

am testing for fluctuations in ROI

growth as well as GNP growth because afFair's and Tufte's findings
that per-capita ROI growth is the strongest indicator of presidential
vote share and also because RDI includes government transfer payments
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-- which Tufte al l eges are another tool of partisan politics -- and GNP
does not.

The RDI tests differ from the GNP equations in only two

respects!

1) they begin with 1949/111, again because of the limited

availability of the data; and 2) the KOREA variable has been removed,
because Korean War activity does not seem to have appreciably affected
RDI growth.

The policy-instruments tests.
additional specifications,

In these tests I employ several

including ones with interaction dummies to

gauge whether these instruments react more strongly to slowdowns in GNP
growth in pre-election quarters than in other quarters.

Some of the

monetary pol i cy specifications include a second interaction term,
similar to that used by Allen, to test whether monetary policy becomes
more accommodative of increases in the federal debt in the pre-election
quarters.
Since a l terations in fiscal and monetary policy instruments have a
less-than-immediate impact on the economy, one must take into account
the "effectiveness lags" of these policy instruments.

The exact

lengths of these lags are uncertairi and cause considerable disagreement
among economists.

Estimates of these lags indicate that a fiscal

stimulUS has a small multiplier effect on the economy in the first
quarter of its application and that its multiplier effect is largest
anywhere from two to seven quarters later.

Gordon estimates that a

monetary stimulus acts with a "short but variable lag," ranging from

l
l

five mont h s

(two quarters) to ten months (four quarters). 59

interpreting the results of the fiscal and monetary models,

Thus in
we should

look at the estimated coefficients of the dummies closely preceding
the election quarter (quarter 16).

In the context of these models,

election quarter ii:self is best viewed as a post-election quarter,
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the

bec~use

of the effectiveness lags.

The fiscal policy test corresponding most closely to Equation
(1.1) is as follows:
FISCAL t
where FISCAL

= f(FISCAL t _ 1 ,
VIET,

= the

DUM1, DUM2, DUM3, .•• , DUM16, ECONOMY,
REAGAN)
(3.1)

real structural budget deficit,

proJected at an

annual rate, divided by real potential GNP; ECONOMY

=

the average

percent change in real GNP growth over the previous four quarters; and
REAGAN is a dummy variable equal to 1 in all quarters during which
Reagan's 1981 tax cuts are in effect (I use as my starting point
1983/11, the quarter in which the final phase of the tax cuts took
effect) and equal to 0 in all previous quarters.

The REAGAN dummy

variable allows for the fact that even after adJusting for inflation
and the size of potential output, the Reagan deficits (after the 1981
tax cuts took full effect) are still so large as to be potentially
significant outliers.

The VIET variable accomplishes much the same

purpose for the Vietnam-era deficits.
A second fiscal policy test, Equation (3.2),
and is similar to (1.2).
(1.3),

uses yearly dummies

A third fiscal policy test corresponds to

except that additional dummy variables (INCUM3 and ORDYEAR3) are

added for the third year of each term,

length of the fiscal policy lag.

because of uncertainty about the

(One could argue that a semi-popular

incumbent president in the third year of his term does not know if he
will be his party's nominee in the following year's election,

but I

think that contention is dismissible. 60 )

II

Equations (3.4) through (3.7) include interaction dummies to test
whether countercyclical fiscal policy becomes more countercyclical in
pre-election quarters than in post-election quarters.
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Equation (3.4)

takes th e form
FISCAL t

=

where INTERCX)

fCFISCAL t _ 1 , YEAR1, YEAR2, YEAR3, YEAR4,
INTER2, INTER3, INTER4, VIET, REAGAN)

= ECONOMY*YEAR(X).

INTER1,
(3.4)

Since countercyclical policy calls

for an increase in the structural deficit in response to slowdown in
reai GNP growth (ECONOMY), the expected coefficients of the INTER terms
are negative.

PBC theory predicts that the coefficients of INTER3 and

INTER4 will be of a greater magnitude than those of INTERI and INTER2.
Equation C3.5) replaces both pairs of third- and fourth-year
dummi es with ORDYEAR3, ORDYEAR4,
INTER3(i) and

IN~ER4Ci).

INCUM3,

INCUM4,

INTER3(o),

1NTER4Co),

INTER3(i) and INTER4(i) denote interaction

dummies for years in which a semi-popular incumbent is running.
INTER3(o) and INTER4(o) denote interaction dummies for all other third
and fourth years.
Equation (3.6) u ses quarterly interaction dummies and a singl e
constant term in place of DUM1, DUM2, ..• ,
Equation (3.7) is similar to (3.6),

DUM16.
but makes a distinction for

semi-popular incumbents in the quarters 9-15, which I define to be the
pre-election quarters.
Because of limited data availability,
earlier than 1955/11.

l

I expect, however,

the FISCAL models begin no
that the only models worth

looking at will be those that omit the data from the Eisenhower years.
The raw data for 1955-1960 show that the Eisenhower Administration ran
its largest budget surpluses in the election years 1956 and 1960,
perhaps under the belief that surpluses and low inflation were what the
voters preferred.
itself~)

(That pattern may well represent a unique PSC in

The inclusion of the Eisenhower data in the FISCAL models

could therefore create serious disturbances in the results.
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The monetary policy models have as their dependent variable the
percent change (from the previous quarter) in the level of non-borrowed
reserves (RESERVES).
RESER VESt

=

The first of these equations takes the form

f(RESERVES t _ l , DUMl, DUM2, ••• ,
ECONOMY, DEBT t _ l )

DUM16,
(4. 1 )

where debt equal s the proJected net change in the federal debt - equivalent to the current federal deficit -- in a given quarter.

Since

a deficit is expressed here as a positive number and a surplus as a
negative number,

a monetary policy that accommodated increases in the

debt would yield positive coefficient estimates for DEBT t _ l in
this and other equations.
Monetary equations (4. 2 ) and (4.3) correspond to (1.2) and (1.3),
in their respective use of yearly dummies, and semi-popular incumbent
dummies for years three and four.

Again,

the INCUM3 and ORDYEAR3

dummies are used because of uncertainties about the length of the
effectiveness l ag.
Equation (4.4) is most similar to (3 . 6),

in that it reg resses

RESERVES on sixteen quarterly interaction variables and a constant term,
as well as on RESERVES t _ 1 and DEBT t _ 1 .
Equation (4.5) uses yearly interaction terms (INTERIY,
INTER3Y,

INTER2Y,

INTER4Y); otherwise it is the same as (4.4).

Equation (4.6) uses quarterly interaction terms and replaces

l
[

DEBT t _ 1 with an additional set of interaction terms of the form
DINTERI = DUM1*DEBT t _ 1 , DINTER2 = DUM2*DEBT t _ l , and so forth.

A

positive coeffi.cient estimate for DINTER(X) means that in quarter X,
Fed's tendency is to monetize increases in the debt.

PBC theory

predicts that the coefficients of DINTER will be largest in the pre election quarters (9-15).
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the

Equatton (4.7) retains the sixteen debt interaction variables but
replaces the sixteen ECONOMY interaction terms with the single
variable ECONOMY.
Equatton (4.B) roughly corresponds to (3.7),

in that it uses

quarterly interaction terms and for quarters 9-lS uses separate
interaction dummies for semi-popular incumbents and all other quarters.
Unfortunately, the consistent data on non-borrowed reserves dates
back only to 1959.

One consequence of this limitation is that

observatj.ons from all but seven quarters of the Eisenhower years are
automatica l ly eliminated.

Thus omitting the Eisenhower data will have

virtually no impact on the monetary regression results.

Test Results
The GNP and ROI tests.
( 1 .1) and (2.1).
a PBC.

Table 1 displays the results for Equations

These results provide some,

but not much, support for

The t-statistics of the quarterly dummy coefficients in

Equation (1..1a),

which covers the full timeframe, are significant at a

Sr. error l evel (i.e., at a 9Sr. level of confidence) in only 7 of the 16
quarters and at a 20r. level in 11 of the 16 quarters.

Thus they

indicate that quarterly variations in GNP growth do not have a great
deal of explanatory value.

In Equation (2.1a),

the t-values are

significant at a Sr. level in IS of the 16 quarters, probably because of

I.
l

the generally high coefficient estimates; in Equation (2.1b),

12 of the

16 dummy coefficients have t-values that are significant at the sr.
level.

In (l.la) and (1.1b),

the estimated coefficients of the dummies

tend to be somewhat higher in the pre-election quarters (quarters 9-16)
than in the post-election quarters (quarters I-B),

although the pattern

is not sufficiently clear-cut to provide strong evidence of a PBC.
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both of these equations, the highest coefficient estimates among the
dummy variables are those of DUMI0, DUMll, DUM13, DUM16 and DUM1.
(Viewed in the context of PBC theory,

the high estimate of DUMl

suggests that politicians may be overshooting their targets.)
lowest coefficient estimates in Cl.la) are for DUM2,

The

DUM4 and DUMB.

The lowest coefficient estimates in (1.1b) are for DUM5 and DUMB,

but

the values of DUM14 and DUM15 (two election-year quarters) are also
quite low.

The estimated dummy coefficients in the RDI tests (2.1a)

and (2.1b) using quarterly dummies display somewhat less variation
among each other and provide less evidence of a PBC.
The test results present a clearer pattern when the GNP and RDI
data are grouped into yearly dummies,

in Equations

(1~2)

and (2.2).

The t-statistics for the individual dummies become consistently
signifi cant, and all four specifications - -

(1.

2a),

(2.2b) -- lend some support to the PBC hypothesis.
Equation (1.• 2b),

(1.

2b),

(2. 2a) and

The estimates for

covering real GNP growth in the post-Eisenhower years,

indicates that GNP growth plummets almost 2 percentage points from its
YEARl rate in YEAR2 and rises by 2 percentage points in YEAR3,
at the YEAR3 level in the election year (YEAR4) and YEAR!.

staying

Thus the

economy bottoms out in the second year of the term, a "post-election"

l
l

L

year.

The results for Equation (2.2b) are similar but better:

growth drops nearly 2 percentage points in YEAR2,

RDI

rises by one-and-a-

half points in YEAR3 and reaches its peak in YEAR4.

Table 2 gives the

test results for these models.
Using a t - test to determine whether the coefficients of YEAR2 and
YEAR4 differ significantly, we see that their difference is significant
at a lOX level in Equation (1.2b) and at a 5X level in (2.2b).
When we replace the YEAR4 dummy with the ORDYEAR4 and INCUM4
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(5.12)*
(4.86)*
2.)9
4.60 .
5.18
(1.95)
(4.2»*
(3.84)*
4.91
6.72
6.25
(3.)4)*
(4.47)*
(4.26)*
.105E-04 .lUE-04 • 955E-05 • 140E-04 .109E-04
(1.09)
(1.08)
(1.04)
(1.)4)
(1.16)

2.12
(2.29)*
5.24
(4.10)*
.157E-04
(1.55)
).)5
(2.81)*
.0418
-.914
(.0665)
(-1.31)

-.746
(-1.12 )

",1.64
-.75)
(-2.28)* (-1.1»

-1.61
(-2.24)*

STATISTICS

VA~!Ar'l: ~~

1945/II1986/111
,48
....

,1961/I1986/11I
) • 47

19 4 8/II1986/1I1
~ 48
J.

1961/11986/1I1
~ 47
."J.

1949/II1- 1961/11986/111 1986/1II
':I 51
':I 6':1
..J.
.J • .J

1949/II1- 1961/11986/1I1 1986/111
':I 51
~ 63
J.
J.

Of{

1.99

2. 07

1.97

2.06

2.04

2.04

, F ::: EOU;OS
:"~ :':A'i 0:-' DEPENDENT

2.05

2.05

-----"

_. ' ,'

~

dummies,

the GNP and ROI models provide very strong support for the

"semi-popular incumbent" version of the PBC hypothesis.
excluding the Eisenhower years,

Including and

the coefficients of INCUM4 are the

highest of all the dummy coefficients in the GNP and ROI models.
all four specifications - -

(1.3a),

(1.3b),

In

(2.3a) and (2.3h) -- the

estimated coefficient of INCUM4 is at least a point (usually two points)
higher than that of OROYEAR4,

suggesting that the presence of a semi -

,........,

popular incumbent in any given presidential election makes a big
difference in the rate of income growth in the year of the election.
(Indeed,

the generally low coefficients of OROYEAR4 indicate that there

is no PBe when a semi - popular incumbent is not running. )
these specifications,
the term,

In three of

income growth is slowest in the second year of

another observation that is consistent with a PBC.

Again using t-tests to determine whether the INCUM4 coefficients
differ significantly from those of the other yearly dummies,

I find the

differencps to be fairly substantial in all of the specifications.
noefficient di.fferences are clearest in Equation (1.3a),
covering 1948/11-1986/111.

The

the GNP model

Table 3 presents the results of these t -

tests for all four specifications.
One should note that the "cycles" in GNP and ROI growth that we
observe in these results are not really business cycles per se,
which periods of recesston follow periods of expansion,
dummy coefficients are never negative.

Rather,

growth are patterns within ongoing business

The fiscal policy tests.

in

because the

these trends in income

cycl~s.

The results of the FISCAL tests

provide weaker support for a PBC than do the GNP and RDI results.
expected,

the specifications that omitted all observations from the

Eisenhower years performed better from the standpoint of PBC theory
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As

than the models that used all available data back to 1955.
C3.3a>,

C3.5a) and C3.7a>,

dummies,

(Equations

all of which included semi-popular-incumbent

are the only exceptions to this rule.'>

The FISCAL tests using

yearly dummies perform better than those with quarterly dummies,

and

the coeffjcients of the interaction terms provide an additlonal
measure

of

evidence of a PSC.

Table 3
RESULTS OF T-TESTS FOR COEFFICIENT EQUALITIES
IN EQUATIONS (1.3) AND (2.3)
BJ = Sk' where BJPV and Bk are two
r.:oeffiGients from the same equation.

"0:

The t-statistl.cs are given in the table.
EQUATIONS
Cl.3a)

( 1. 3b)

(2.3a)

C2.3b)

2.26
(5Yo)

2.01
(5Yo)

1. 39

2.20
(5Yo)

1. 03

2.38
(5Yo)

.966
(40Yo)

1. 55

C40Yo)
1. 40

1. 75

1. 26

1. 39

(20Yo)

(lOYO )

C40YO)

(20Yo)

.641
(60Yo)

2.03
(5Yo)

.912
(40Yo)

.681
(60Yo)

COEFFICIENT PAIR
YEAR1,
YEAR2,
YEAR3,

l
l
l

INCUM4
INClIM4
INCUM4

ORDYEAR4,

INCUM4

(20Yo)

(20Yo)

The error levels of statistical significance are in parentheses.
Equation (3.1b) gives somewhat mixed results.
coefficient estimates are those for DUM8,

The highest

DUMI0, and DUMI4, and

the only negative coefficient is for DUM1; but the t-values of these
quarterly dummies are mostly insignificant at the 5Yo level.
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In

addition,

a lthough DUMl has the only negative coeIIicient,

lowest coefIicients are those OI DUMll and DUMl5,
quarters.

th e next -

two pre-election

Thus the pattern is an inconsistent one.

The tests using yearly dummies yield significant t - statistics Ior
the dummies,

probably due to the larger number of observation s

hence the smaller standard errors) that each dummy
encompasses.

In (3.2b) and (3.3a),

va~iable

the estimated coeIficient OI

ECONOMY is negative and signiIicant at a

5~

level,

fiscal policy tends to "lean against the wind."
results of these two regressions.

indicating that

Table 4 gives the

In Equation (3.2b),

the YEAR4

coefficient is highest and the YEARl coeIIicient is lowest,
accordance with a PSG;
at a 30% error level.

(and

in

the diIference between the two is signiIicant
In Equation (3.3a),

the INGUM4 coeIficient is

the highest and the INGUM3 coefficient is the next highest.
and YEAR1 coefficients differ at a

10~

error level.

for ORDYEAR3 and ORDYEAR4 are by Iar the lowest,

The INCUM4

The coefficients

providing support for

the "semi - papular-incumbent" version of a PSG.
When yearly interaction dummies are added to the model,
(3.4b),

in Equation

the original yearly dummies show l ess OI a PSG-like pattern;

but we see that fiscal policy tends to be countercyclical in all years
except the post-election YEAR1 and that it reacts most strongly to
decelerations in the rate of real GNP growth in the pre-election YEAR3.
Table 4 include s the regression

[

u

result~

Equations (3.5a) and (3.7a),

of this equation.

which include separate interaction

variables for semi-popular incumbents, prove very little.

The

responsiveness of fiscal policy to decelerations in GNP growth appears
not to depend on whether or not a semi-popular incumbent is seeking re e lection.

Equation (3.6b) uses quarterly interaction terms but does
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Tabl. 4
ECUATIONS
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

(3.2b)

(3.3a)

(3.4b)

rISCAL t. - l

. 768
112.7).

.840
( 18. 7).

.739
ClI.7).

YEARI

. 341
r 2. 14)

. 283
r 2. 141 •

.0576
(.223)

YEAR2

. 449
(2.92) •

.379
r 3 . 01)'

. 534
r 3.01)'

YEAR3

.419
(2.76)'

. 582
(3.22)'

YEAR4

. 541
( 2. 88) •

.377
(1.301 •

ORDYEAR3

. 149
c. 894)

ORDYEAR4

. 0720
(.484)

tHCU"3

.438
(2.24)·

tHCU"4

.691
(2.97).

ECONOt1Y

-.0575
(-2.35)

- .0584
( -2 .66)

INTERI

l
l

.0181
(.3131

THTER2

-.0782
(-2.05).

tNTER3

-. 120
(-2.45)

INTER4

-. 0129
(-.231)
• 239E-05
(1. 56)

VIET

.220E-05
(1. 46)

. 320E-05
(2.091.

REAGAN

.770
(3.15) •

.505
(2.211.

. 824
(3.18"

1. 19

0. 732

1. 19

2. 2 5

2 . 32

2.31

t-atat1atics 1n parentheses
REGRESSION STATISTICS

~EAN OF DEPENDENT
VARIABLE

ow
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not perform as well as the tests using yearly interaction dummi es.
The monetary policy tests.

The results of Equations (4. 1),

(4. 2 )

and (4.3) provide not a shred of evidence of an electorally - related
pattern in the growth of non-borrowed reserves.

Moreover,

the low t -

statistics for the quarterly and yearly dummies indicate that these
dumm ies do not even provide meaningful ways of grouping th e data.
rest of the monetary models use a constant term,

The

the t-valu es of which

are consistently significant.
Tho se equations yield positive coefficient estimates for DEBTt - l,
indicating that the Fed monetizes increases in the debt to some extent,
but Equations (4.6) and (4.7) -- which include the quarterly debtinteraction terms -- provid e no evidence that the Fed' s willingness to
monetize the debt varies with the electoral cycle.

Aga:!.n,

the t-

statistics for these individual variables are mostly insignificant.
The monetary equations with an ECONOMY term yield negative and
signifiCAnt coefficient estimates for this term,

suggesting that the

Fed responds countercyclically to fluctuations in real GNP growth.
And,

Judging from the results of Equations (4.4) and (4.8),

that the Fed' s willingness to "lean agains t

it seems

th e wind" is th e on e aspect

of monetAry policy that does indeed vary with the presidential cycle
and a long th e lines of a PBG.
Tables 5 and 6 display the regression results of (4.4) a nd (4.8).
They show monetary policy to be countercyclical in almost every quarter
except quarter 16,

the first post-election quarter,

highly procyclical.
(i.e.,

in which policy i s

Moreover, policy is most strongly countercyclical

th e interaction term has the largest negative coefficient) in

quarter 15, especially when a semi-popular incumbent i s up for re election.

In (4.4A),

INTERIO,
51

INTER13 and INTER14 have relatively

Table 5

COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES IN EQUATION (4.4a)
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE

COEFFICIENT

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE

C

1. 43

INTER9

-. 197
(-.543)

-.053
( - .491)

INTER10

- .415
(-1.42)

- . 132

INTER11

.0491
( . 169)

(2.50)*
RESERVES t - 1.
INTERl

( - .484)

COEFFICIENT

INTER2

- .273
(-.997)

INTER12

- .0726
(-.220)

INTER3

- .0958
(-.322)

INTER13

- .324
( -1. 09)

INTER14

- .267
(-1.15)

INTER15

- .613
( -2. 57'*

INTER4

.17B
( . 661 )

INTER5

- .251
(-1. 00)

INTER6

- . 193
( - .701)

INTER16

.561
(2.09)*

INTER7

- .207
(-.722)

DEBT t - 1

.00912
( 1. 78)

INTER8

- .246
(-.791)

t-statistics in parentheses
* - indicates statistical significance at a 5% error level

l
lJ

Mean of dependent variable

52

=

1.22.

DW

=

2.01.

Table 6
COEFFJCIENT ESTIMATES IN EQUATION (4.8a)
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE

c

COEFFICIENT

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE

1. 35
(2.25)*

INTER12(o)

RESERVESt - l

- .0464
( - .409)

INTER13(o)

- .728
(-1.67)

INTERl

- 1.43
(-.528)

INTER14(o)

.0933
( . 250)

INTER2

- .268

INTER15(o)

.252
(. 651>

INTER16

.563
(2.15)*

(-1. 00)'

Ll

COEFFICIENT
.00395
(.00986 )

INTER3

-.0898
( - .309)

INTER4

.179
( .677)

INTER9(i)

INTER5

- .250
( -1. 02)

INTER10Ci)

.142
( .237)

INTER6

- . 182
( - .676)

INTER11< 1>

.179
( . 321 )

INTER7

-.194
(-.692)

INTER12( 1>

- .216
(-.418)

INTER8

- .227
(-.752)

INTER13Ci)

- .0370
(-.100)

INTER9(o)

- .202
(-.532)

INTER14 (i)

- .474

INTER10(o)

- .544
(-1.67)

INTER15(i)

INTERll(o)

.0243
( .0752)

- .0152
( - .0148)

( -1. 75)

DEBT t - 1

- 1.05
( - 3.79)*
.0111
(2.06)*

t-statistics in parentheses
* - indicates statistical significance at a 51 error level
Mean of dependent variable

=

1.22.
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DW

=

1.91.

l arge negative coefficients as we l l.
INTER12(i) and INTER14(i).
spectacular -- in deed,

In (4.8a),

the same i s true of

These test results are in no way

the t-values for most of the interaction dummi es

are insignificant at even a 201 error level - - but the t-values of
INTER15,

INTER15(1) and INTER16 are significant at a 51 level and a

pattern is apparent.
Conclusion

The r egression resu l ts for the models I constructed using macro aggregates (GNP,

RDI growth rates) as the dependent variables and the

models using pol i.cy inst.ruments as the dependent variables are far from
symmetr:i. ca l.

Tahle 2 presents impressive evidence that peaks in GNP

a nd RDI growth are coincident with years in which a semi-popular
incumbent president. seeks re-election,

plus additional (though less

striking) evidence of a regular four-year presidential business cycle;
but the results of the fisca l

and monetary regressions provide only

mild support for the hypothesis that the government engenders such
pattern s.
The fiscal - policy test results are more favorable to PSC theory
than a r e the monetary results.

This seems altogether logical,

given

that fiscal policy is more directly under politicians' control than
monetary po l icy.

u

Still, although the coefficient estimates of the

fiscal equat.ions in Table 4 follow the pattern of a PBC,

the fourth -

year coefficients do not differ from the other coefficients in these
equations at the same high levels of statistical significance as the
ones in t.h e GNP and ROI models (Equations (1. 3) and (2.3».
addition,

In

the dummy coefficients often do not appear large enough to

have a pronounced effect on the macroeconomy.
The monetary regression results indicate that Fed policy is more
54

strong l y countercyclical in pre-election quarters than in post -e l ection
quarters,

hut too many of the quarterly dummy coefficients in these

regress ions (Equations (4.4a) and (4.8a»
In addition,

20X error l evel.

are insignificant at even a

to say that the Fed' s policy at any

given time is countercyclical means not only that it increases the
growth of reserves when the GNP growth slumps,

but also that it

decreases the growth of reserves when the economy is booming.

Hence

the countercyclical policy that the Fed employs in pre-election
quarters is sometimes a contractionary policy instead of an
expansionary one.

The absence of evidence of a cycle in the growt h

rate of reserves in relation to political cycles alone,
Fed' s willingness to monetize changes in the debt,

or in the

seems to say more

about the connection (or lack thereof) between monetary policy and
presidential elections than do the ECONOMY interaction dumm ies .
If politicians are in fact attempting to create a politica l
business cycle,
might.

then they do not go as far in this endeavor as they

The resu lt s of the fiscal and monetary regressions provide some

eviden ce that they try to e ngineer such cycles; but however
irresponsible such attempt s may be,
seems altogether s l ight,

the damage they wreak on the economy

because the policy changes seem too small to

have any great impact.
Thus we are left with strong evidence of a presidential business
cycle in the trends in national income growth,

l

but notably l ess

evidence of a po l itical cycle in the making of fiscal and monetary
policy.
my review

This is mu c h the s ame conclusion that I
~f

the previous PBC literature.

reached at th e end of

It couid be that the economi c

upturns in presidential election years are for the most part unrelated
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to governmental policy manipulations.
opposite of Akerman's,

The cycle could well be a polar

on e in which business and investor confidence

ri ses i n anticipation of an upcoming election and falls after the
election outcome i s settled.

Perhaps firm s and investors expect th e

economy to do we l l

in election years and adJust their plans for those

years accordingly,

and their increased investment has the usual

multiplier effect.

Whatever explanation one chooses,

the "presidential

business cycle" seems to arise from more than Just attempt s by
polit i cians to stimulate the economy at election time.

U
!

J
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APPENDIX:

a

_.

DATA SOURCES

The vast maJority o£ the data I used in my empirical tests came
£rom monthly issues o£ Business Conditions Digest (BCD)~ a
publication o£ the U.S. Department o£ Commerce's Bureau o£ Economic
Analysis.
The BCD data included the £igures I used £or real GNP
growth rates, RDI levels. the Producer Price Index £or Industrial
Commodities. the unemployment rate and the in£lation rate (GNP
de£lator).
Because o£ an inconsistency between the pre-1985/II1 data
£or GNP and RDI, which is given in terms o£ 1972 dollars, and the
post-1985/III data, which is given in 1982 dollars, I £ound it
necessary to de£late the latter £igures by a value o£ 2.131.
A slight
discontinuity still exists between the pre- and post-1985/II1 data,
un£ortunately, because the latter £igures incorporated some other
revisions besides the change o£ base years.
I do not expect that the
discontinuity is great enough to seriously a££ect the test results,
however.
The estimates o£ the structural
well as the GNP de£lator that I used
constant-dollar terms, were obtained
Brookings Institution in Washington,
1985/IV.

de£icit and real potential GNP, as
to put the structural de£icit into
through the courtesy o£ the
D.C.
This data ran £rom 1955/1 to

The data £or non-borrowed reserves, which ran £rom January 1959 to
March 1986, was provided by the Federal Reserve Board in Washington,
D.C.
This data is adJusted seasonally and also £or changes in reserve
requirements.
As mentioned in the text, I obtained the quarterly
£igures £or non-borrowed reserves by comparing monthly averages £rom
the £inal months o£ successive quarters -- i.e., £rom March, June,
September and December.
I multiplied the percent di££erences by 4 in
order to put them in annual terms.
The semi-annual Vietnam manpower figures are £rom Table IV of
The Wars in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, 1945-1982: A Bibliographic
Guide, by Richard D. Burns and Milton Leitenburg (Santa Barbara,
Cali£ornia: ABC-Clio Information Services, 1984).
They obtained their
£igures £rom the U.S. Department of De£ense.
The Gallup Poll £igures which I used as the criteria for "semipopular incumbents" came from several compendiums o£ Gallup surveys:
The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971 (Volumes 1-3; New York:
Random House, 1972); The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1972-1977
(Volumes 1 and 2; Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 1978);
The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, yearly volumes from 1978 through
1984 <Wilmington: Scholarly Resources. 1979-1985); and o££icial Gallup
press releases from 1985.
Wherever applicable, data is adJusted £or seasonal £luctuations.
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